Readify

Sabra and Shatila

Here There Is No Why

Sabra and Shatila is presented as a pair of Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, though Yoav Lerner sharply disputes the word “camp” because it places the site between radically different meanings: Auschwitz as a place of extermination, recreational camps associated with leisure, and these densely degraded suburbs marked by war. The location is therefore not merely a setting for violence. Its disputed name becomes part of the moral argument about how language classifies suffering, distributes responsibility, and permits distant readers to misunderstand what happened there.

Setting and the Massacre

Yoav recounts that his military unit was stationed a few kilometers south of Sabra and Shatila during the 1982 Lebanon War. From his tent, he and other soldiers heard gunfire, Arabic commands broadcast through loudspeakers, and screams that sounded like the cries of children. They assumed that children were being executed. The next day, Israeli soldiers learned that hundreds of civilians had been murdered—perhaps four hundred or five hundred, possibly more—including mothers, babies, and dozens of children.

The Israeli soldiers did not intervene while the killings were taking place. Yoav remained at his post, monitoring radio transmissions, while the sounds continued in a repeating pattern of screams and shots. He describes touching his rifle whenever a scream came, ready for orders that never arrived. In his account, roughly ten thousand Jewish soldiers stood by while allied Phalangist forces killed civilians. The location thus becomes the scene of a double fact: the massacre was carried out by the Phalangists, but Israeli forces nearby failed to prevent it.

After the violence fell silent, Israeli troops received orders to enter the area. About two hundred and fifty soldiers, perhaps fewer, moved in by jeeps and halftracks. Yoav entered at the rear while continuing to monitor communications. He saw bodies but refuses to reproduce their details for the journalist questioning him, except by asking the listener to imagine a mother holding two babies, each killed by a bullet. The scene is treated as an image that must be faced rather than consumed as spectacle.

Responsibility and the Bystander

The soldiers disarmed the Phalangists they encountered. The militia members handed over rifles supplied by Israel and withdrew after having killed enough Palestinians to communicate their threat that anyone who remained would be murdered. Yoav resists the simplified claim that Israeli troops physically halted the massacre: the killings had already stopped before the Israeli force entered, although the Phalangists may have stopped because they learned that Israeli troops were coming. The difference between “we stopped them,” “they stopped,” and “we allowed it to happen” becomes central to the location’s ethical meaning.

Yoav’s account insists that the truth is worse than either of the principal media distortions. Some American reports initially claimed that Israel had carried out the massacre. Later reports said that Israel had “allowed it to happen,” a formulation that he regards as morally closer but still inadequate in its suggestion that Israeli forces formally permitted the murderers to enter. For Yoav, the decisive fact is simpler and more damning: Israeli soldiers did not intervene when they heard the killings. They became the bystanders whom Chaim Lerner had condemned when writing about the death camps.

That reversal gives Sabra and Shatila its lasting place in the novel. Chaim had made the moral failure of bystanders a central object of Holocaust reflection, and the massacre placed Israeli soldiers in a position that echoed the passivity of the wider world during the Holocaust. Yet Yoav rejects the easy journalistic conclusion that Chaim killed himself because Israel had become the perpetrator of the crime he had spent his life remembering. He says that Chaim did not care enough about Palestinian suffering, or about collective Israeli guilt, to die for Sabra and Shatila. The site matters instead because it exposes the dangerous gap between historical analogy, actual conduct, and the explanations imposed afterward.

Journalism, Memory, and Mediation

Sabra and Shatila is also the point at which the novel attacks the conversion of atrocity into a finished media narrative. Yoav accuses American journalists of writing from inaccurate sources and shaping those errors into philosophical theories. Their accounts, in his view, moved from the false claim that Israeli forces had perpetrated the massacre to the more qualified but still morally charged claim that Israel had permitted it. The location is therefore mediated through competing reports before it can be encountered as a physical place or a witnessed event.

The massacre’s representation is repeatedly contrasted with Chaim’s own writing about Buna, the Auschwitz rubber factory. At a Sabbath meal, Chaim remembers an apple divided among four prisoners and the beauty of a young woman’s bare ankle glimpsed after months without seeing a woman. He calls such experiences “Moments of Reprieve”: flashes of beauty and vitality within horror. Sabra and Shatila receives no comparable consoling image. Its bodies are withheld from description, while the ethical problem of hearing the killings and remaining inactive is kept fully visible.

The place also enters the later investigation into Chaim’s death through a chain of retrospective interpretation. American writers describe Chaim as the “six million and first victim” of Holocaust writing, suggesting that the accumulated burden of witnessing may have driven him to suicide. Yoav’s account adds Sabra and Shatila as a possible trigger for that theory, but then rejects it. The massacre can illuminate Chaim’s moral vocabulary and the historical pressure surrounding his work without supplying a sufficient motive for his death.

Narrative Significance

Sabra and Shatila functions as a geographical and moral boundary between Holocaust memory and Israeli military power. At the site, Jewish soldiers hear the sounds of civilians being killed, possess weapons, and wait for orders that do not come. The resulting crisis is not resolved by assigning every act to a single perpetrator. Instead, the narrative distinguishes direct murder, military alliance, nonintervention, subsequent intervention, inaccurate reporting, and retrospective blame.

Its significance lies precisely in this resistance to a clean chronology. The Phalangists killed civilians; Israeli forces entered afterward and disarmed them; journalists rearranged the sequence; Chaim’s son used the disputed accounts to explain what his father read and how the event might have affected him. Sabra and Shatila consequently becomes a test of whether historical responsibility can survive the pressures of political defense, national shame, Holocaust analogy, and narrative simplification. The location remains unforgettable not because the novel offers a final formula for guilt, but because it makes the reader hold together what the competing stories try to separate: the massacre itself, the failure to intervene, and the struggle over who is allowed to name what happened.